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Abstract. This paper unearths the interaction of financial intermediaries as financial structure and financial agent’s behaviors in 
shaping economic welfare given the dynamic nature of economy. The paper acts as an intuitive walk with interconnected 
conclusions from one finding to another and raises the issue through juxtaposing opposite economic policies (no-usury policy in 
ancient Greek civilization and modern capital market) with strikingly similar economic outcomes of wealth inequality. It sheds 
light that financial structure and agent’s behaviors have more important influence compared to that of financial instrument in 
shaping welfare. Through historical overview, it shows the responsiveness of economy (acceptance and adoption of interest rate). 
The qualitative synthesis suggests that economic policies ought to possess complementary approaches to overcome structural 
(moral hazard and credit risk) and behavioral issues (agent’s speculative tendency and predictive ability). The practical implication 
is capital and liquidity requirements to financial intermediaries for structural issues and Tobin tax and commitment of long-run 
fiscal policy for behavioral ones. The reflexive nature of economy has a theoretical and managerial implications that economic 
policies ought to be constantly evaluated and give a sense of security to intermediaries and agents to yield the most satisfactory 
outcomes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The use of interest rate in investment system has had a purpose of bridging lender’s willingness to forgo present consumption 
and borrower’s ability to pay for capital that are available to them presently. Investments with more uncertainty and greater 
tendency of failure deems higher cost of capital. The higher the risk, the higher the returns demanded by investors. In essence, 
interest rate has become a tool to quantify risks to enforce fairness. 
 
With such purpose, it follows that the use of interest rate which ensures fairness deems an equal wealth distribution. The 
modern economy has widely accepted, adopted, and even required interest rate as a tool in the investment system (although 
some exceptions exist), especially in capital markets. Allegedly then, the global wealth distribution ought to be even. However, 
Statistic Portal shows that 0.8% of the world’s population owns just a little less than half of the global wealth, while 68% of the 
population comprised of individuals who own less than 10 thousand U.S. dollars of net worth in comparison. Without a doubt, 
there are multiple variables of a nation’s wealth distribution, yet one must have wondered the magnitude of effect that financial 
instrument, in this case interest rate, and its policy, has on equality. If the exercise of interest rate is the best policy because it 
encourages fairness, the state of the economy should be at its maximum potential. And this would deem, at least, close-to-equal 
distribution of wealth. However, the statistics does not seem to support it. With such unequal distribution of wealth, a closer 
investigation to an economy where interest rate is not exercised is executed. Kron (2011) conjures a wealth distribution curve in 
ancient Greek civilizations or the classical period, where no-usury policy is exercised. Among 31,000 male Athenians, only 3% is 
liable to pay taxes because their wealth surpasses a certain limit. The Lorenz wealth distribution curve shows that ancient Athens 
has a Gini coefficient of 0.708 and US has 0.71 in 1953-4 and 0.794 in 1998. Kron concludes that the Athenian wealth distribution 
is strikingly similar to that of the modern welfare state. 
 
Despite the contrast of interest rate policies, the wealth distributions of modern economy and that of ancient Greek civilization 
have an uncanny resemblance. It is apparent that other factors persist beyond mere financial instruments such as interest rate 
which affect wealth distribution and the economy as a whole. Wealth equality, influenced by the use of interest rate, is one of 
the components of financial stability in economic welfare, which comprised of two forces: structural, which is the nature of an 
economy’s financial architecture, and behavioral, which is the rationale and actions of financial agents. Extensive literature 
presents sturdy evidence of a direct correlation between an economy’s financial structure and its welfare. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Levine (2007) attribute 60% to the development in financial service industry for the income increase in the poorest quintile 
and 40% for inequality decrease. Gole and Sun (2013) find a positive inclination in economic outcomes through the 
intermediation that financial services offer. In addition, the contemporary findings on financial agent’s rationale and course of 
actions have enabled economists to conjure theories that better explain market phenomena. Findings in behavioral economics 
are suggestive and persistent to show the realness of influence that psychology has on economy.  
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The core issue of this paper is to illuminate how the structural variables (financial architecture) and agent’s behaviors are 
associated with economic welfare and how they interplay with one another. The aim is to create an intuitive walk through 
extensive dissections of pertained literature (qualitative approach), in hope to aid to policy-making strategies. There are several 
limitations within this paper: omission of supremacy analysis, exclusive factors of interest, omission of causalities assignation, and 
economic science focus. The investigation is carried out with literature review (whose objectivity, reliability, and validity are 
examined based on a criterion described in methodology) that delves in the structural and behavioral variables, particularly, the 
ones that explain the interaction and implication among the variables with economic welfare. The findings and synthesis infer 
moral hazard and credit risk in financial intermediaries as the structural problems and the speculative tendency and predictive 
ability of agents as the behavioral problems. Moral hazard precipitates risky credits which gives rise of bubble and overshadow 
burst and crises (bank runs) while agent’s speculative propensity create a short-term gain-focus that escalates overvaluation of 
assets (exceeding the fundamental values), aggravating the situation. Agent’s predictive ability disrupts optimality of iterative 
government policy. The practical remedies are: Basel III and CRD IV for moral hazard, Tobin tax for agent’s speculative tendency, 
and long-run fiscal policy commitment for agent’s predictive ability.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Firstly, an explanation on the rationale of no-usury policy in classical period is laid out as a stepping stone. The policy is the basis 
of Hellenistic economy. With religion being a prominent element of the society, Xenophon, successor of Socrates, correlates 
priority of morality with handling resources. He encourages giving managerial positions to men “with a ruling soul, archaic man”. 
Baloglou (2012) mentions this tangibility of economics with morality as the “particular characteristic of the Ancient Greek Oikos 
[that] distinguishes...[itself] from the modern one.”. With such importance on morality in the civilization, Aristoteles categorizes 
economic transactions into such: Commodity-Commodity’, Commodity-Money-Commodity’, Money-Commodity-Money’, 
Money-Money-Money’ (Baloglou, 2012). The list is arranged in descending manner in ethical spectrum where breeding money is 
highly frowned upon because it hoards wealth in one place rather than distribute it and the ac is associated with greed. To this 
reason, no-usury policy is implemented, and emulated by other civilizations of the age. 
 
However, the dynamic nature of economy and real growths has tackled the notion of greed to be associated with interest rate. 
Zarlenga (2010) states that by 1956, loanable funds with interest entailed was overwhelmingly accepted. The modern economy, 
started after Smith’s (1776) Wealth of Nations, progresses to be ever capitalistic. Smith emphasizes the necessity of interest rate 
for it acts as a compensation borne by the borrowers for the opportunity cost that investors agree to incur on themselves by 
lending money. This view is the basis of the use of interest rate in current investment system. 
Real economic growths have also given rise to high complexity in financial system, which is evident through the change of 
perspective on interest rate from classical period to modern economy. The more complex the financial system is the more 
evident is the need to employ a sound design of financial architecture for well-functioning economy to deliver satisfactory 
outcomes. However, intermediaries pose a risk on the economy due to their interconnectedness. Past crises have corroborated 
the magnitude of fatality incurred by welfare through the (contagion of) failures of intermediaries. Studies confirm direct 
correlation of structure with welfare and calls for the best policy to govern the financial structure of an economy. Yet contrary to 
traditional belief that economy should and could be quantified and predicted through canonical mathematics, real life instances 
do not suggest just so. Bernoulli’s utility theory becomes the enlightenment in the realm of behavioral economics, because it 
involves and attempts to explain the nature of financial agents. The digression from canonical calculations is not only probable 
but persistent in everyday life. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and Friedman and Savage (1948, 1952) also expounds on 
the abstractness agents’ behavior. Although debates linger, the existence of behavioral variables which digress economic 
outcomes from mathematical predictions are evident. Findings in behavioral variables would be a decision-making tool for 
policies governing financial agents, which eventually direct the economic welfare. 
 
In light of the realness on structural and behavioral effects on welfare, a synthesis from these studies are conducted: 
 
No. Researcher Title 
1 Fisher (1933) The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions 
2 Friedman and Savage (1952) The Expected-Utility Hypothesis and the Measurability of Utility 
3 Prescott and Kydland (1977) Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans 
4 Nadauld (1978) The Interest Rate Elasticity of Networth in Savings Institutions 
5 Tobin (1978) A Proposal for International Monetary Reform 
6 Shiller (1981) Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in 
Dividends? 
7 Prescott and Kydland (1982) Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations 
8 Fischer (1991) Growth, Macroeconomics, and Development 
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9 Thakor (1996) The design of financial systems: An overview 
10 Thaler (1999) The End of Behavioral Finance 
11 Akerlof (2002) Behavioral Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Behavior 
12 Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) Demand-deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs 
13 Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2007) Finance, Inequality and the Poor 
14 Palley (2010) Destabilizing Speculation and the Case for an International Currency 
Transactions Tax 
15 Wooldridge (2012) Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data 
16 Delis, Hasan, and Kazakis (2012) Bank Regulations and Income Inequality: Empirical Evidence 
17 Gole and Sun (2013) Financial Structures and Economic Outcomes: An Empirical Analysis 
18 Takahashi and Okada (2013) An Agent-Based Model of Business Cycle with Gestation Period 
19 Flannery and Hankins (2013) Estimating Dynamic Panel Models in Corporate Finance 
20 Carletti and Leonello (2016) Regulatory Reforms in the European Banking Sector 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The type of the research is descriptive processed by systemic literature review. To evaluate the internal and external credibility 
(stability and consistency) of the sources, validity test is executed in order to conclude if the source findings could be generalized 
(Sekaran and Bougie, 2010). The source reliability is based on the “degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to 
the same category by different observers or by the same observer in different occasion,” (Silverman, 2006).  
 
A synthesis from the literatures is used to dissect the extent of influence and association that financial structure and agent 
behavior have on economic welfare (sources include articles, journals, books, lectures, websites, and posts). Major themes 
investigated are: financial intermediaries as structure and their influence on the economy, the persistent interaction of behavior 
variables in economy, and the mitigations and remedies of issues on financial structure and agent’s behaviors. Selecting the 
literature would be a process based on the guidelines provided by Sekaran and Bougie, involving: 
1. Consideration on how literature title is pertinent to the theme investigated 
2. Relevance evaluation of the abstract on its purpose, general methodology, findings, and conclusions and towards 
the proposed theme  
3. Further consideration on the first chapter of the literature for clearer picture on how the literature is relevant 
4. Credibility evaluation based on the quality of the journal that publishes it: impacts and number of citations 
 
FINDINGS AND ARGUMENT 
 
Systematic literature follows that researches on the issues investigated, starting from the structural variables, are dissected for 
their implications, followed by deductive conclusions. Gole and Sun (2013) find a positive correlation between a nation’s financial 
structure and its economic outcomes. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2007) attribute 60% to the financial service 
development for income increase in the poorest quintile and 40% for inequality decrease. Delis, Hasan and Kazakis (2012) 
emphasize the significant effects that banking regulation, one key element in financial architecture, has on welfare.  
 
These findings infer that more developed financial intermediaries as financial structure the smoothens leading economic 
indicators and induce the better would the economic outputs be. With such importance, Fischer (1991) and Fisher (1933) agree 
that macroeconomic management ought to be alert with structural indicators, since on the structural side, macroeconomic 
policy plays a vital role in economic outcomes and ought to address the risk associated with intermediaries: moral hazard due to 
asymmetric information and credit leniency which is a recurring theme in financial intermediaries. 
 
However, if orthodox economic theories truly capture reality, instable indicators would not have been generated because 
theoretically there are cures for every economic dysfunction. Fisher (1933), Shiller (1981), Thaler (1999), and Akerlof (2002) 
confirm a persistent digression of theoretical economics and reality. Keynes (1936) particularly argues that speculation is the 
starter of the evils that deviates market from efficiency due to its short-term horizon. The ineffectiveness of Black Scholes 
Merton model in Black Monday suggests just so. Findings has inferred and even confirmed the gravity of danger that agent’s 
short-term profit focus (speculation) has on economic welfare. Another behavioral problem in economy is agent’s predictive 
ability. Kydland’s and Prescott’s (1977) argue on nonoptimality of discretionary policy. Despite an agreed-upon social objective, 
discretionary policies (such as lowering tax rate in times of recession) have perverse effects on economic stability or at most only 
work subpar. Such phenomena occur due to the consistency of responsiveness in discretionary policies and the ability of agents 
to predict the government actions given the current economic status. In addition, the very implementation of discretionary 
policy changes the nature of economy which requires another set of regulations to respond to it, and so forth.  Although agents 
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only act on imperfect information to formulate predictions on government plans, optimal policy control is invalidated because 
the agent behavior is a variable in selecting “optimal” policy. In other words, agents’ current decisions are influenced by their 
expectations of future policy, and the responsive economic policy is iterative and is expected by agents. Such is the paradox of 
macroeconomic policy-making. 
 
Fortunately, academics and practitioners have shifted to formulating theories which integrates this abstract component of 
economy Soros’ (2009) theory of fallibility and reflexivity sheds light on economic phenomenon more realistically than canonical 
theories. The data on human bases their actions are impaired due to the pervasion of fallibility, and naturally their actions would 
not yield the initial expectations. This phenomenon is salient in social science because human beings are not merely observers of 
the truth, like they are in physical science, but are also participants that “create” reality. Economic academics and practitioners 
ought to be aware of such demarcation between the natural and social sciences. While economists know that natural sciences 
involve laws that reign absolute, they might not be aware that the laws in social sciences do not have the same nature due to 
human fallibility and reflexive influence on reality. The different states of governing laws deem that the methodologies of 
justifying and falsifying theories ought to also differ. 
 
Abstinence of formulating causalities, as Gole and Sun (2013) have done and this paper emulates, could be the first step towards 
achieving appropriate methodology in social science, it allows room for reverse relationships. Unlike natural science, a change in 
an independent variable does not necessarily mean a predetermined change in a dependent variable. Consistent with Soros’s 
reflexivity, using dynamic panel estimator further eliminates strict exogeneity and allows researchers to focus on the interactive 
connections between variables rather than assigning causes and outcomes. Given the correct methodology, the government 
then should be better prepared to implement structural and behavioral policies given the discussed issues, which are moral 
hazard and credit leniency for financial structure and speculative tendency over investing and predictive ability in agent’s 
behavior. The banking regulatory reforms of Basel III and CRD IV encourage global financial structures to be financially sound to 
an unprecedented extent. The capital buffer acts as structural discouragement for moral hazard, as intermediaries have no other 
choice than to internalize the investment risks to their own entities’ health, which allows safer fund allocations and more 
probability of returns to depositors. 
 
However, although the buffer policy discourages risky credits, it does not shield the economy from financial agents’ propensity to 
speculate. Tobin tax or Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) imposes tax on agents who perform arbitrage in currency. The tax 
combats excessive flow of money in the money market resulting from agents seeking profit in currency discrepancies. Further 
discouragement on short-term profit maximizing could also be exercised by enlarging the scope of Tobin tax. Not only should it 
be implemented on currency, but also on ranges of securities and derivatives. Meanwhile, agent’s predictive capability on 
government policy should be assuaged through consistent, long-run commitment in fiscal policies, as Kydland (2019) prescribes. 
It is important to note that the consistency should be implemented to the fiscal policy itself, not the repetition of policy in 
response to the state of economy, which betrays the consistency being discussed. Rather than adding more to the uncertainties 
of financial and commodity markets, the government ought to enforce certainty in tax policies. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
For the practical implications on the structural issues, the moral hazard and credit risk (which lead to bank runs and systemic 
cripple) is overcome by intermediaries’ internalization of investment risk through capital and liquidity requirements which act as 
a buffer, while the practical implications on behavioral side is FTT and commitment for long run fiscal policy. FTT limits 
speculation or short-term profit seeking. Together, both implications holistically target problems where one overcomes issues 
which another could not tackle:  Tax on securities discourages asset value volatility, which is what the buffer is exercised for. In 
addition, to contain agent’s predictive ability, consistent long-run fiscal economic policy is recommended. Contrary to the 
argument that consistency would feed predictability, it yields more satisfactory economic outcomes than changing tax policies. 
The reason behind this is the non-uniformity of agent’s expectation of future policy, which requires multiple 
“unpredictabilities”/responses in economic policy, which is infeasible and is almost surely contradictory. Another reason is the 
mitigation of agent’s uncertainties; the consistent fiscal policy induces government credibility to the public. The fact that some 
after thoughts on the recommendations persist underline the yet-imperfect nature of the policies themselves. However, 
although the methodology and practical prescriptions require on-going process of consummation, it could hardly be otherwise 
when it comes to economics, due to its dynamic nature. The recommendations discussed implies managerial and theoretical 
considerations that the mitigations ought to be evaluated on reflexive nature of economy. Nonetheless, given the circumstances 
and prospects, they are promising, both for implementations and for improvisations. 
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